Screen a payee address before an AI agent pays: sanctions, mixers, scam lists, on-chain risk.
Listed on
- Official MCP Registry
- Glamavia MCP Toplist
First seen 2 Oct 2026. One server, whatever directories list it: each directory listing keeps its own page and history.
2
Directories
1 via MCP Toplist
12
Tools
From an anonymous probe
-
ToolBench grade
Not graded by Arcade
0
GitHub stars
From MCP Toplist
Tools
| Tool | Description | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| attest_control_baseline | File your operator's control-baseline attestation — the counterpart to counterparty_control_baseline. That tool asks what controls the OTHER side runs; this one publishes what YOUR side runs, so payers can see it before settling with you. No account, no key, one call. Gaps are allowed and expected: answer false where a control is not in place and describe how you plan to close it in gapPlan. A filing with declared gaps is worth far more than no filing — it lets a payer decide against a known shape instead of a blank. Get the control ids from the baseline list first. Only file for a party you are actually authorised to speak for. | Changes data |
| baseline_controls | Fetch the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline: the list of controls an agent operator is expected to run before it is allowed to move money, each answerable yes or no. Call this before attest_control_baseline so you file against real control ids. Each control carries which gate enforces it and why it exists. | Read-only |
| check_calldata_intent | Anti blind-signing. EVM: decodes what a transaction's calldata will actually do (ERC-20 transfer/approve/permit, setApprovalForAll, ownership transfer, native transfer). Solana: decodes a whole base64 transaction (SPL Token / Token-2022 Transfer, TransferChecked, Approve, SetAuthority, CloseAccount, Burn; System Transfer / Assign; ATA creation). Compares it with what you believe you are doing. EVM: pass intent:{action:'pay', to, amount} plus contract (the transaction's to) and data (hex calldata). Solana: pass network:'solana' and transaction (base64) instead of data. decision match = does what you declared; mismatch = different recipient/amount/asset, or an approval / authority change instead of a payment — do not sign; unknown = could not decode (including address-lookup-table accounts), which is not the same as safe. | Read-only |
| counterparty_control_baseline | Answers a different question from address screening. Screening asks whether an address is risky; this asks how much damage the agent on the other side could do if it were talked into something. Returns that party's self-attestation against the OceanAlt Agent Control Baseline, split into two sets that must NOT be conflated: verified_by_oceanalt (enforced by the gateway on every payment — provable) and self_claimed (what they state about their own side — NOT verified by OceanAlt). Most parties have not attested: found:false means no information, not a bad signal. | Read-only |
| evidence_bundle | Everything OceanAlt holds about an address as public facts, in one Ed25519-signed bundle you can verify offline: screening verdict with evidence and freshness, profile signals, one-hop relations to listed addresses, fulfillment receipt stats and coverage. A witness, not a prosecutor: no conclusions about people. Same as GET https://oceanalt.com/api/evidence/bundle. | Read-only |
| payee_decide | The receiving side's check before settlement. Given the payee's registry id (sid) and, optionally, the payer, amount and purpose, returns accept / decline / hold_request_info / not_ready with reason codes, the fields to request, evidence and a signature. Rule-based, not a model's opinion. Same logic as POST https://oceanalt.com/api/payee/decide. | Read-only |
| payment_decision | Call this before every payment your agent makes. Free, no signup, no API key. Pass the payee address the agent is about to pay; get a machine-executable decision: allow | review | decline, plus verifiable evidence and retry semantics — use it as a gate: if the decision is not "allow", do not pay. On allow/review it also returns a verifiable compliance attestation you can attach to the settlement so the payment carries proof it passed OceanAlt's decision. Free, no API key. | Read-only |
| recent_flagged | Return a representative sample of addresses on OceanAlt's reviewed risk list — OFAC-sanctioned, known mixers, and scam/phishing — each with its source category and reason. Takes no arguments. Free, no API key. | Read-only |
| resolve_agent_identity | Resolves who stands behind a paying agent: agent -> principal -> mandate -> credential -> wallet. Each link reports whether it holds; completeness counts how many do (a factual count, not a score). Wherever the chain breaks is where accountability stops. Publication is opt-in and only posture is exposed (that a ceiling exists, never its value), so found:false means the agent has not published — absence of information, not a bad signal. | Read-only |
| screen_address | Run an AML compliance screen on a single blockchain address BEFORE paying or receiving from it — the pre-payment check on a counterparty. Checks OFAC sanctions, known mixers, scam and phishing lists, stablecoin issuer freezes, and on-chain heuristics. Returns a verdict (clear | caution | risky), a 0–100 risk score, a blocked flag, and the matching signals — receipts, not a black-box score. A clear verdict means nothing was found in the data OceanAlt holds; it is not a statement that the address is safe. Depth varies by chain (see coverage.chains at /.well-known/agent-capabilities). Supports EVM (0x…), Tron (T…), Solana (base58). Free, no API key. | Read-only |
| screen_endpoint | Screen a payment ENDPOINT (URL or domain) before calling it — the half that address screening cannot answer. In x402 the agent discovers a URL first, receives a 402, and only then learns where to pay: if that endpoint is spoofed, the payee address it hands back is freshly generated and appears on no sanctions list. Checks the hostname and its parent domains against phishing-domain intelligence plus hostname shape signals (bare IP, punycode homograph, deep subdomain nesting, free hosting). Returns clear | caution | risky | unknown with language-independent signal_keys. A clear verdict means no match was found, NOT that the endpoint is safe — freshly registered phishing hosts always precede any list. Use together with screen_address. Free, no API key. | Read-only |
| verify_payment_requirements | Before paying an x402 402 response, check that its payment requirements (payTo, amount, asset, network, resource) were signed by the seller and not altered in transit by a proxy, CDN, SDK or another tool. x402 v2 carries the requirements in the PAYMENT-REQUIRED response header (base64 JSON): pass either the decoded JSON or the raw base64 value as body. Optionally pass expect:{payTo, amount} — the address and amount you are about to pay — and the tool also checks they match what was signed. verified:false with reason_code no_signature means the seller does not sign (unprotected, not necessarily malicious); digest_mismatch or signature_invalid means the response was tampered with — do not pay. | Read-only |
| Directory | Listing | Tier | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| Official MCP Registry | com.oceanalt/aml | - | 2 Oct 2026 |
| Glama | Listed there according to MCP Toplist’s dataset; not collected by InvokeRank. | ||