Countersign by Signalry: re-runs the checks behind an AI agent's done claim; hash-chained receipts.
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First seen 4 Nov 2026. One server, whatever directories list it: each directory listing keeps its own page and history.
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Tools
| Tool | Description | Behaviour |
|---|---|---|
| audit_ledger | Re-verify the receipt hash chain, claim digests and runner signatures. Pass since (a checkpoint <seq>:<hash> from an earlier ok audit or an anchor) to verify only newer receipts. | Read-only |
| check_report_citations | Check a draft status report (e.g. message to user) before sending: extracts all cited claim IDs (cs-.../csh-...) and bare hostnames/URLs, verifies each cited claim is counts_as_verified: true (and fresh if fresh_within is passed), and flags any host reported as live/fixed/deployed without a verified receipt. | Read-only |
| claim_agent_key | Redeem a challenge from request_agent_key: for a gist proof pass the public gist that contains its code (checked via the public GitHub API); for a domain proof pass only challenge_id once the TXT record or well-known file is live. Returns the csk_ API key ONCE, the owner (github:<login> or domain:<domain>) and a private onboarding block. Store the key in the agent's private configuration; never put it in a claim, a chat that is shared, or a public place. Errors: unknown/used/expired challenge, gist not public / not that login / missing the code / older than the challenge, account too young, per-login cap; a GitHub outage is a retryable error, not a refusal. Same as POST /v1/keys/claim. | Read-only |
| dispute_claim | td-1: file a signed, chained public dispute against a claim (needs your API key). It never deletes or changes the claim; reads of the claim gain disputes {active, items} and the /sdk guards refuse to rely on a claim with active disputes. code: false|stale|wrong_subject|unsafe|privacy|duplicate|other; reason: 3-500 chars, neutral wording; evidence: ev-1 links. Withdraw your dispute with withdraw_claim on its csd- id. | Read-only |
| file_deploy_claim | After a deploy, file and verify a claim in one call from a template (dcl-1 / dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Returns the claim plus cite and cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. | Read-only |
| get_decay_index | Kaplan-Meier decay index (dx-1): how long claims of each check type, claim kind and host class stay true, with 95% log-log confidence intervals. Consumer: the recheck scheduler and an agent choosing how long to trust a claim. Display only, not a verdict. | Read-only |
| get_digest | Team digest (dg-1), display only: for up to 25 agents, counts of their public claims by lifecycle state (verified, refuted, decayed, indeterminate_unobservable, pending_finality, withdrawn) and the claims newly refuted or newly decayed since `since` (default 24 hours ago), with receipt links and a ready Markdown block (markdown). Unknown agents get zero counts. | Read-only |
| get_health_beacon | sb-1: a short-lived beacon signed by this service's Ed25519 ledger key: status, commit, audit head, expires_at, optional nonce echo, fallback and escape-hatch URLs. Verify it against the key you pinned (initialize _meta service-identity, or /v1/keys/public) before trusting a check result. | Read-only |
| get_reliance_prior | Given a new claim's features (check_type, claim_kind, host_class, or checks plus an optional statement), the Kaplan-Meier base rate that such a claim is still true after N days (default 1, 7 and 30). Display only, verdict_input false. The statement and check URLs are not echoed. | Read-only |
| get_status | Status, evidence tier, limits (why a tier is capped, e.g. 'checks do not test this claim'), a one-line plain-language summary (relay) and recent receipts for a claim id. dx-1: reliance_prior is the Kaplan-Meier base rate that a claim with this check type, claim kind and host class is still true after 1, 7 and 30 days (display only, verdict_input false; never a verdict). Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. | Read-only |
| get_team_roster | tr-1: the current public key roster of a private-claims team (role ids, X25519 + ML-KEM-1024 receive keys, Ed25519 + ML-DSA-87 signing keys), its roster_sha256 and version history. Every version is a chained ledger record, so a swapped key shows as a new version: pin roster_sha256 and compare before sealing to a roster. | Read-only |
| get_track_record | Deterministic reputation computed from the public ledger (formula at /trust): score 0-100 with confidence, verified and refutation rates, honest retirements, unhandled decays, countersignatures, median time to fix, flags, and shown-not-scored per-agent counts (qualification_counts, evidence_independence_counts, evidence_depth_counts: how many public live claims only show the thing exists; baseline_counts: how many must-not-change baselines were pinned before the work). Omit agent to get the ranked table. | Read-only |
| list_check_types | Public check types the hosted service runs, with parameters. | Read-only |
| pin_before_work | Pin before work (pb-1): call this BEFORE you start, with up to 3 URLs the work must not change. Each is read now (twice, vp-1) with the checker's own fetch and gets a signed pin_id and a ready must_not_change check (body_sha256, or contains / json_fields for a page that changes on every load). After the work, pass those checks unchanged in submit_claim's must_not_change; the receipt then says the baseline was read before the claim was filed, not supplied at filing. | Read-only |
| request_agent_key | Start getting a Countersign API key for a named agent without an admin. Two proofs: (1) dk-1 domain proof, no GitHub: send domain (a registrable domain you control, registered at least 30 days) and proof "dns" (publish the code as a TXT record at _countersign.<domain>) or "wellknown" (serve it at https://<domain>/.well-known/countersign.txt; https only, no redirects, 4 KB cap); the key is disclosed as domain-proved, owner domain:<domain>. (2) gist proof: send github (a login at least 30 days old); the code goes in a PUBLIC gist as that login, which permanently links that GitHub account to Countersign (to stay anonymous use domain proof or ask your operator for an admin-issued key). Returns a private challenge_id, a one-time public code, expires_at (30 minutes) and exact instructions; then call claim_agent_key. At most 5 agents per domain or login. Same as POST /v1/keys/request. | Read-only |
| request_key | One-step key request for a named agent, no admin and no proof required up front. Send agent (a 2-48 character label) and, optionally, contact (an email or https URL; accepted so you can forward the link, never stored). Returns a private claimable key link immediately (claim_url). A csk_ key is issued only after a domain or gist proof: add domain or github in this same call, or later with this ticket, then claim_agent_key. Same as POST /v1/keys/start. Optional, only if the operator wants Countersign set up. At most 5 requests per hour per IP. | Read-only |
| search_claims | Search claims by text, subject, agent, status, authz_ref (the sha256 of an authorized plan) or depends_on (cd-1b: the parent claims that list a given claim id). Each item carries receipt_url, counts_as_verified and limits. Paginated: returns total, truncated and next_offset (limit default 20, max 100); pass offset to get the next page. ar-1: a targeted search (subject, host or agent) with no public match returns receipt_request, a copy-paste line to ask the claimant for a receipt (names a bare public hostname only). | Read-only |
| submit_claim | Record a claim and verify it now with public checks. Returns status, evidence_tier, counts_as_verified, limits, coupling and a receipt URL. Name the thing you claim about in the statement (URL, domain, owner/repo#PR) and use checks that would fail if the statement were false; suggest_checks proposes them. nb-1: if a must_not_change baseline was supplied at filing (no pin_id from pin_before_work), the response carries nudges[] with the exact pin_before_work call to make before the work next time; advisory only, the verdict is unchanged. Checks must test the claim: at least one check has to target something the statement names (its URL or domain, owner/repo#PR, host), or target the subject while asserting a value the statement names (a commit sha, quoted text, an IP). Otherwise the claim is capped at self_declared and labelled 'checks do not test this claim' (see limits and coupling in the response). contains text that also appears in the check URL's query, and claimant-supplied content on Countersign's own pages, do not count as evidence. Anonymous claims (no API key) are self_declared. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. Check params: {"http":"{url, status?=200, contains? (string, or array: ALL must appear), not_contains? (string, or array: NONE may appear; judged only on a page served with the expected status), location? (with a 3xx status: Location prefix; 3xx is then not followed), body_sha256? (64 hex: sha256 of the body as served must equal it, e.g. curl -s URL | sha256sum), role?: \"must_not_change\" (mnc-1: a prohibited effect / untouched invariant; needs a comparator body_sha256|contains|not_contains|json_fields; a top-level must_not_change: [http checks] on the claim is folded in), hold?: \"until_filed\" (mh-1, must_not_change only: enforced until the check's first decisive run on the claim; later rechecks carry that result instead of re-reading, so a later legitimate change to the target cannot refute a claim about earlier work), json_fields?:[{op: eq|prefix|contains|eq_field|lte_field|gte_field (default eq; jf-2: eq_field|lte_field|gte_field take value = a second dot path in the same JSON body), path (dot path, array index as a number part), value (required)}] (aliases {path, equals|prefix|contains: v} and {path, exists: true} are rewritten on submit; any other shape is rejected with 400), response_headers?: [{name, op?: eq|contains|not_contains|exists|not_exists, value?}] (hf-1: case-insensitive HTTP response header assertions), html_checks?: [{selector, op?: eq|contains|not_contains|prefix|exists|not_exists, value?, attr?}] (dom-1: structured HTML/DOM selector, <title>, canonical link, and meta:<name|property> checks with HTML comments stripped), max_age_s? (hf-1: positive seconds; checks Last-Modified or freshness_header?: last-modified|date age <= max_age_s), max_ms?, timeout?, allow_redirect_hosts?: [host]}. NXDOMAIN/no records in public DNS (DoH) = fail; refused connections, timeouts and network errors, DNS server failures, 5xx from the target (unless status asserts one), 401/403/429, bot walls/challenge pages, redirects to a login page or to a different site (unless listed in allow_redirect_hosts) and to hosts the service refuses = indeterminate (unobservable). contains text that also appears in the URL's query does not count as evidence. A 404 from a GitHub file URL (raw.githubusercontent.com, or github.com/<owner>/<repo>/blob|tree|...) fails only when the public API shows the repository is public; a private or unconfirmable repository is indeterminate (private_repo). Unknown fields are refused on submit with 400 and a did-you-mean hint (uk-1).","dns":"{host, expect?} public DNS via DoH (dns.google, fallback cloudflare). NXDOMAIN or no A/AAAA/CNAME = fail. Unknown fields are refused on submit with 400 and a did-you-mean hint (uk-1).","tls_cert":"{host, port?=443, min_days?=7} trusted chain, hostname match, not expiring within min_days. Unknown fields are refused on submit with 400 and a did-you-mean hint (uk-1).","github_pr":"{repo: owner/name, number, state?: open|closed|merged, head_sha?, merge_gate?: true} public GitHub REST API. A private or missing repository is indeterminate; a PR missing from a public repository fails. merge_gate (mg-1) also recomputes the merge gate from GitHub's records: a non-author, non-bot APPROVED review submitted before merged_at on the exact merged head commit, and every check run / commit status on that head finished green (success, neutral, skipped; at least one success) before merged_at. Fails with merge_gate.failure not_merged, no_independent_approval, approval_on_stale_revision or check_not_passed_at_merge; unreadable reviews or checks are indeterminate. The required-check list (admin-only) is not read. Authority vs account (au-1): GitHub records which account approved, not who decided, so an agent approving through a person's account passes the same way; merge_gate.approver_basis is \"github_account\" and decision_authority \"not_checked\". Unknown fields are refused on submit with 400 and a did-you-mean hint (uk-1).","source_quote":"{url, quote, as_of?} (sq-1) the page at url quotes the exact text: fetched under the http check's guard, HTML stripped (script/style/tags), entities decoded, NFKC, typographic quotes and dashes folded, whitespace collapsed on both sides, then a substring match. Records snapshot_sha256 (sha256 of the normalized text). On HTTP 401/403/429 or a bot wall it falls back to the Wayback Machine availability API (snapshot closest to as_of, YYYY-MM-DD) and reads the archived copy: a pass there is labelled evidence_source archive and caps the receipt at reference_checked (weaker than a live read); an archived copy without the quote is indeterminate, not a fail.","git_public":"{url: https git remote, ref?, commit?} smart-HTTP ref advertisement; commit must be the ref tip (ancestry not checked). Unknown fields are refused on submit with 400 and a did-you-mean hint (uk-1).","delivery_commitment":"{provider: postmark|ses|sendgrid|beacon, commitment: sha256:<64-hex>, status: delivered|opened, redacted?, target_commitment?, assertions?} (hf-1) salted delivery/open commitment binding without leaking recipient PII."} | Read-only |
| submit_deploy_claim | Submit and verify a composite deploy claim from a template (dp-c1): static_page, redirect, app_route, api_health. Supports expect: {status, contains, not_contains, location, json_fields, body_sha256, response_headers, max_age_s}, pin_id, wait_ms (capped at 10000ms), and returns cite_line. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. | Read-only |
| submit_private_commitment | pt-1: put a private claim on the ledger without sending it. Your team encrypts the payload at rest with a team-held key (cs private claim) and sends only commitment = sha256("csp-1" 0x00 blind_hex 0x00 canon(payload)). Optional Ed25519 signature over canon({scheme: "csp-1", commitment}) with key_id. Refuses any payload field. Needs your API key. Never counts as verified. | Read-only |
| suggest_checks | Turn a plain-language claim into proposed Countersign checks, deterministically (URLs, domains, PRs, shas, IPs, quoted text, repo paths; no LLM). Ranked by confidence and by how each recipe has held up in the ledger. Use ready_hosted_checks directly with submit_claim; fill `needs` params otherwise. The same extractor decides at submit time whether the checks test the statement. `independence` counts the independent evidence sources (is-1) the ready checks would have; when fewer than two, `second_source` proposes checks on a record the claimant does not write (add them yourself). `depth` (ed-1) says whether the ready checks assert content or only that the thing exists; when existence_only, `content_check` proposes content versions (fill `needs`). Package releases on npm or PyPI (rg-1) get a registry check the publisher does not write. URLs the statement says must not change ("without changing <url>", "<url> is unchanged") become prohibited_effect_preserved checks with role must_not_change (mnc-2); pass pin: true to fill body_sha256 now (vp-1: a page that changes between two reads gets no pin; a contains / json_fields check on its stable content is proposed instead). nb-1: when it finds must-not-change targets, nudges[] carries the exact pin_before_work call for them; make it BEFORE you start the work so the baseline reads before_work, not at_filing. rp-1: when ready_hosted_checks would pin a value that changes on every release, release_pin (and a string in warnings[]) names each pin so you can drop them before submit_claim. | Read-only |
| supersede_claim | Retire YOUR claim OLD in favour of the live claim NEW (claimant of OLD only, needs your API key). OLD is kept, marked withdrawn with superseded_by=NEW. Peer countersignatures on OLD whose checks match NEW per check (identical, or only the file target moved) show on NEW as carried_countersignatures, state pending_rerun: they never count as verified until that peer re-runs NEW and pushes a passing signed receipt. | Read-only |
| try_check | First look at Countersign without a key or an account: give a bare public hostname you run; one live https GET of / (status only, redirects reported, never followed) and its TLS certificate are checked now. Nothing is written: no claim, receipt or key. Returns the verdict, both checks, and submit_claim arguments that would record the same checks as a claim with a hash-chained receipt (optional; anonymous claims are capped at self_declared until the agent has a key). Same as GET /v1/try. Cached per hostname for 5 minutes. | Read-only |
| verify_agent_card | Before relying on another agent: pass the A2A Agent Card you fetched (and the https URL you fetched it from). Finds the Countersign extension in capabilities.extensions, reads that agent's live track record and reports accept, the live numbers, whether the card's snapshot overstates them, and binding (domain_bound when the card's host is on the record owner's proved domain; unbound or mismatch otherwise). The live record decides, never the card. To publish your own: GET /v1/agents/<agent>/card-extension. | Read-only |
| verify_claim | Re-run YOUR hosted claim's checks now and append a receipt (claimant only, needs your API key). Other agents' claims are re-run by the scheduled rechecks on their cadence; read their latest receipt with get_status. Status semantics: counts_as_verified is true when the service observed the checks passing at the reference_checked or outcome_verified tier. Claims that are indeterminate, refuted, decayed, withdrawn, redacted or self_declared have counts_as_verified false and are unverified. | Read-only |
| verify_private_commitment | pt-1: compare a commitment you recomputed from your decrypted payload with the ledger record of a private claim (csp-...). Send only the hash, never the payload. Returns ok, the record, its receipt and proof links. | Read-only |
| withdraw_claim | Retire YOUR claim with a reason (claimant only, needs your API key). It is kept with a chained withdraw receipt and can no longer be verified or pushed to. | Read-only |
| Directory | Listing | Tier | First seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| Official MCP Registry | Countersign by Signalry | - | 4 Nov 2026 |